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9.1. Introduction and scope of the chapter 
While it is accepted that inappropriate or indiscriminate design, use and 
disposal of a wide range of technologies are responsible for global as well as 
local environmental degradation, it is also widely recognized that fostering 
appropriate technological change is a necessary part of the solution. As will be 
discussed below, industry, agriculture and the service sector must have the 
willingness, opportunity, and capacity or capability to undertake technological 
changes. These changes could involve the adoption of already-proven technol-
ogies, or require incremental to radical innovation. In addition to process and 
product changes, changes in the organization of production and work also 
properly fit under the rubric of technological change. 
In highly industrialized countries, the predominant response to environ-
mental degradation has been to regulate maximum allowable emission and 
effluent levels, and concentration limits, in air water and soil directly, define 
acceptable levels and limits by reference to those achievable by application of 
certain technologies, such as best available technology (BAT), or require the 
adoption of specific technologies. There is a considerable literature on the 
effects of classical regulatory approaches on technological change, but little has 
been written on the effects of alternative or supplemental non-mandatory 
instruments, such as information-based initiatives and negotiated agreements, 
on technological change which are in a sense 'voluntary' on the part of industry. 
This chapter attempts to fill that void. 
It is, however, important to be cognizant of the various effects that 
regulation might have on technological change because many so-called 
voluntary approaches occur against a backdrop of regulation and the success 
of some voluntary approaches are based on incentives that mimic regulation, 
such as civil liability (Ashford and Stone, 1991). The central questions are 
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whether and to what extent more flexible approaches can be used to foster 
technological change, what kinds of technological changes are likely to be 
encouraged relative to classical regulatory approaches, and what are the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for those more flexible approaches to 
succeed? The core of such an enquiry requires an analysis of incentives and a 
behavioral model of firm behavior which explains the effect of incentives on the 
responding industrial sectors. 
9.2. Technological change defined 
Technological change is a general term that encompasses technological 
innovation, invention, diffusion, and technology transfer (Ashford and Cal-
dart, 1996). Technological innovation is the first commercially successful 
application of a new technical idea. Sometimes the innovation is embodied in 
hardware and devices, sometimes in the organization of production and work, 
and sometimes in both. Innovation should be distinguished from invention, 
which is the development of a new technical idea, and from diffusion, which is 
the subsequent widespread adoption of an innovation by those who did not 
develop it. The distinction between innovation and diffusion is sometimes hard 
to draw, however, because innovations can rarely be adopted by new users 
without some modification. When modifications are extensive, i.e. when 
adoption requires significant adaptation, the result may be a new innovation. 
The term technology transfer is somewhat imprecise, sometimes referring to 
the diffusion of technology from government to industry, or from one industry 
or country to another. Although the term technology-forcing is most com-
monly used to mean the forcing of invention or innovation, it is also often used 
to mean the forcing of diffusion or technology transfer as well. 
An innovation can be characterized by its type, by its significance, or by the 
activity from which it evolves. Innovation can be process-oriented or product-
oriented. It can be modest and incremental or radical and revolutionary in 
nature. Innovation can be the result of an industry's main business activities or 
can evolve from the industry's efforts to comply with health, safety, or 
environmental demands. Regulatory instruments, economic incentives and 
voluntary initiatives, can affect any of these characteristics. 
9.3. Historical evidence for the effects ofregulation on technological change 
The reductionist version of neoclassical economic theory predicts that since 
environmental regulation imposes non-productive investment by industry on 
pollution control, regulation can only be a drag on innovation, and hence on 
economic growth, because of the diversion of resources from R&D.! A more 
modern view currently in vogue is the so-called Porter hypothesis (Porter, 
1991), which argues that regulations may actually stimulate growth and 
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competitiveness. In fact, that suggestion and the empirical evidence that 
supports the hypothesis goes back to a series of publications from researchers 
at MIT beginning 12 years earlier (Ashford et aI., 1979, 1985; Ashford and 
Heaton, 1983; Ashford, 1993), although Porter does not seem to be conscious 
of it (Jaffe et aI., 1995). 
There is ample evidence that regulation, if properly designed and implemen-
ted, can prompt the kind of technological change that can significantly reduce 
human and environmental exposure to toxic substances. Prior work has 
developed models to explain the effects of regulation on technological change 
(Figure 9.1). The particulars of this model, the nature of the regulatory 
stimulus, the characteristics of the responding industrial sectors, and the 
resulting implications of the model for explaining technological responses to 
regulation and for designing innovative regulatory strategies, are discussed 
below. As we will see, the model is also useful for predicting the results of 
voluntary initiatives by industry. 
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Figure 9.1. A model for regulation-induced technological change 
9.3.1. The regulatory stimulus 
Environmental, health and safety regulations affecting the industry that uses or 
produces a regulated chemical include controls on air and water quality, solid 
and hazardous waste, pesticides, food additives, pharmaceuticals, toxic sub-
stances, workplace health and safety, and consumer product safety. These 
regulations control different aspects of development or production; they 
change over time; and they are technology-forcing to different degrees. 
Furthermore, the internal structure of regulations may alter the general climate 
for innovation. Elements of that structure include the form of the regulation 
(product versus process regulation), the mode (performance versus specifica-
tion standards), the time for compliance, the uncertainty, the stringency of the 
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requirements, and the existence of other economic incentives that complement 
the regulatory signal. 
The distinction between regulation of products and regulation of processes 
suggests yet a further distinction. New products differ from existing products, 
and production process components differ from unwanted by-products or 
pollutants. Regulations relying on detailed specification standards (which 
specify the technology to be installed) or on levels of control achievable by the 
best available technology may discourage innovation while prompting rapid 
diffusion of state-of-the-art technology. Although a phased in compliance 
schedule allows a timely industry response, it may prompt only incremental 
improvements in technology. 
An industry's perception of the need to alter its technological course often 
precedes promulgation of a regulation. Most environmental regulations arise 
only after extended scrutiny of a potential problem by government, citizens, 
workers, and industry. Prior scrutiny often has greater effects on industry than 
formal rule making, because anticipation of regulation stimulates innovation. 
For example, formal regulation of PCBs occurred years after the government 
expressed initial concern. Aware of this concern, the original manufacturer and 
other chemical companies began to search for substitutes prior to regulation. 
Similarly, most firms in the asbestos products industry substantially complied 
with Occupational Safety and Health Administration asbestos regulation years 
before it was promulgated. This pre-regulation period can allow industry time 
to develop compliance technologies, process changes, or product substitutes 
while allowing leeway for it to adjust to ensure continued production or future 
commercial innovation. 
The government's initial show of concern is often, however, an unreliable 
stimulus to technological change. Both technical uncertainties and application 
of political pressures may cause uncertainty regarding future regulatory 
requirements. Nevertheless, some regulatory uncertainty is frequently bene-
ficial. Although excessive regulatory uncertainty may cause industry inaction, 
too much certainty will stimulate only minimum compliance technology. 
Similarly, excessively frequent changes to regulatory requirements may frus-
trate technological development. (Tunable economic instruments, such as 
pollution taxes, also provide inherently uncertain signals, although they may 
achieve better static efficiency employing off-the-shelf technology.) 
Regulatory stringency is the most important factor influencing technological 
innovation. A regulation is stringent either because compliance requires a 
significant reduction in exposure to toxic substances, because compliance using 
existing technology is costly, or because compliance requires a significant 
technological change. Legislative policy considerations dictate different 
degrees of stringency. Some statutes require that standards be based predomi-
nantly on environmental, health, and safety concerns; some on existing 
technological capability; and others on the technology within reach of a 
vigorous research and development effort. 
In the early 1970s most environmental, health, and safety regulations set 
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standards at a level attainable by existing technology. The regulations reflected 
both a perceived limit to legislative authority and substantial industry influence 
over the drafting of standards. Some recent regulations, such as the technol-
ogy-based standards for hazardous air pollutants under the 1990 amendments 
to the Clean Air Act, have tended toward greater stringency, but they still rely 
on existing technologies, although often those in minority or rare use. The 
effect of the agency's strategy on innovation is not confined to standard setting. 
Innovation waivers or variances, which stimulate innovation by allowing non-
compliance with existing regulation while encouraging the development of a 
new technology, are affected by enforcement strategies as well. These are 
discussed under Negotiated Agreements (below). Finally, the degree to which 
the requirements of a regulation are strictly enforced may influence the 
willingness of an industrial sector to attempt to innovate. 
9.3.2. Characteristics of the responding industrial sector 
The industry responding to regulation may be the regulated industry, the 
pollution control industry, or another industry (see Figure 9.1). Regulation of 
existing chemical products or processes might elicit installation of a pollution 
control device, input substitution (the substitution of one input chemical for 
another), a manufacturing process change, or product reformulation. The 
regulated industry will likely develop new processes and change inputs; the 
pollution control industry will develop new control devices; and either the 
regulated industry or new entrants will develop reformulated or new products, 
depending on their inherent innovativeness in the product area. Regulation of 
new chemicals (such as pre-market screening), however, will simply affect the 
development of new products. 
Past research on the innovation process in the absence of regulation has 
focused on the innovation dynamic in diverse industrial segments throughout 
the economy (Utterback, 1987). The model of the innovation process on which 
that research focused refers to a 'productive segment' (a single product line) in 
industry, defined by the nature of its technology. Automobile engine manufac-
ture would be a productive segment, as would vinyl chloride monomer 
production, but neither the automobile industry nor the vinyl chloride industry 
would be a productive segment since they both encompass too many diverse 
technologies. Over time, the nature and rate of innovation in the segment will 
change. Initially, the segment creates a market niche by selling a new product, 
superior in performance to the old technology it replaces. The new technology 
is typically unrefined, and product change occurs rapidly as technology 
improves. Because of the rapid product change, the segment neglects process 
improvements in the early period. Later, however, as the product becomes 
better defined, more rapid process change occurs. In this middle period, the 
high rate of process change reflects the segment's need to compete on the basis 
of price rather than product performance. In the latter stages, both product 
and process change decline and the segment becomes static or rigid. At this 
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point in its cycle, the segment may be vulnerable to invasion by new ideas or 
disruption by external forces such as regulation or an energy crisis that could 
cause a reversion to an earlier stage. 
9.3.3. The explanation of technological responses to regulation and implications 
for the design of strategies 
Review of the history of regulation on technological change confirms that 
product regulations tend to call forth product innovations, that pollutant 
regulations tend to elicit process innovations, and that the stringency and 
relative certainty of regulation are important determinants of technological 
innovation (Ashford et al., 1985). These observations are expected from the 
general innovation model described above. Responses to regulation will be 
influenced by the inherent innovativeness of the responding industrial sector, 
which in turn can be predicted from past patterns of innovation along either 
product or process dimensions. Further, as is discussed below, the responses of 
industry to information-based initiatives or negotiated agreements will likewise 
be more or less predictable. 
The value of this theory of innovation is that it provides a rationale upon 
which an environmental or governmental authority may fashion a regulation 
or other strategy aimed at the industry most likely to achieve a desired 
environmental goal and by which the private sector can develop a more 
appropriate response to environmental problems. Consistently, the theory 
relies on the assumption that the strategy designer can determine the extent of 
an industry's innovative rigidity (or flexibility) and its likely response to 
incentives with reference to objectively determinable criteria. 
9.4. Information-based approaches 
Information-based approaches can be voluntary, such as eco-Iabelling or 
certain kinds of eco-audits, or they can require the firm to report emissions, 
effluents and sudden/accidental releases to the environment, or to disclosing 
the exposure of workers to toxic substances. To the extent that there is high 
demand for green products in a certain country, one might well expect product 
innovation from a producer in a certain product niche, providing that producer 
has the capability to engage in product innovation. Where the established 
product is unsafe, or undesirable from an environmental perspective, and not 
worthy of an eco-Iabel, a new entrant with a superior product may very well 
displace a well-established, but non-innovative product firm. To the extent that 
a firm's product not only has to be safe, but has to be manufactured safely and 
its inputs be environmentally acceptable to earn an eco-Iabel, process innova-
tion, or at least modification, may occur, and input substitutions from existing 
alternatives may be fostered. Unfortunately, most eco-Iabelling schemes start 
with the firm, given its inputs, and ignore manufacturing processes, concen-
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trating instead on product use and disposal. 
Eco-audits can serve the purpose of making the firm more aware of its 
environmental problems and, if the firm is capable, search for technological 
alternatives in inputs and manufacturing process to produce the same product 
in a more environmentally friendly way, or reformulate its product, providing 
it is in the firm's economic or reputational interest to do so. The eco-audit alone 
will not drive the firm to either innovate or to adopt technology in use 
elsewhere, unless there are significant economic costs associated with polluting 
that can be avoided or benefits to changing production (such as recovering 
valuable material in pollution streams). To the extent that eco-auditing schemes 
require the firm to submit a plan to remediate its pollution and to follow up 
with action, there could be significant technological change. This is mostly not 
the case. 
Right-to-know requirements for the reporting of emissions, effluents and 
sudden/accidental releases to the environment or the disclosure of the exposure 
of workers to toxic substances by a firm could prompt significant demands 
from the community or workforce to control pollution, providing they have 
timely access to the reported information. In the United States, industry 
reporting requirements have lead to easy, but important changes in production 
practices, usually under the description of house-keeping or maintenance 
changes. Where loss of valuable starting material or final product is discovered 
by the reporting requirements, some process changes may be stimulated. 
Whether its interest in pollution prevention comes in response to legal 
requirements or as a result of voluntary risk reduction efforts, a firm must have 
access to information about pollution prevention technologies if it is to adopt 
or adapt them. Environmental agencies have had a mixed history in making 
such information available through information dissemination, demonstration 
projects and technical assistance to firms. 
Beyond simply sharing information on particular technologies, the agencies 
could help promote pollution prevention by helping firms to think about their 
technological options in a more formal and systematic fashion. In order to 
facilitate pollution prevention or the shift to clean (or cleaner) technologies, 
options for technological change must be articulated and evaluated according 
to multivariate criteria, including economic, environmental and health/safety 
factors. The identification of these options and their comparison against the 
technology in use is called technology options analysis (TOA) (see Ashford, 
1994). 
At first blush, it might appear that TOA is nothing more than a collection of 
multivariate impact assessments for existing industrial technology and alter-
native options. However, it is possible to bypass extensive cost, environmental, 
health and safety, and other analyses or modelling by performing comparative 
analyses of these factors (such as comparative technological performance and 
relative risk and ecological assessment). Comparative analyses are much easier 
to do than analyses requiring absolute quantification of variables, are likely to 
be less sensitive to initial assumptions than, for example, cost-benefit analysis, 
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and will enable easier identification of win-win options. Thus, while encom-
passing a greater number of technological options than simple technology 
assessment (TA), the actual analysis would be easier and probably more 
believable. 
TOAs can identify technologies used in a majority of firms that might be 
diffused into greater use, or technologies that might be transferred from one 
industrial sector to another. In addition, opportunities for technology devel-
opment, that is, innovation) can be identified. Government might merely 
require the firms or industries to undertake a TOA. On the other hand, 
government might either force or assist in the adoption or development of 
new technologies. If government takes on the role of merely assessing (through 
TA) new technologies that industry itself decided to put forward, it may miss 
the opportunity to encourage superior technological options. In this case, only 
by requiring or undertaking TOAs itself is government likely to facilitate major 
technological change. Both industry and government have to be sufficiently 
technologically literate to ensure that the TOAs are sophisticated and compre-
hensive. Once superior existing technologies or technologies within easy reach 
of development are identified, the firm may be motivated to change out of both 
economic self-interest and in order to avoid possible future liability resulting 
from the failure to adopt less polluting or safer technology. 
9.5. Negotiated agreements with government 
Negotiated agreements with government differ from other so-called voluntary 
approaches in that they may be motivated by a desire on the part of industry to 
facilitate the achievement of legislated or mandatory environmental goals by 
introducing flexibility and cost-effective compliance measures, to negotiate 
specific levels of compliance fulfilling more general legislative mandates, or to 
negotiate legal definitions of best available technology and other technology-
based requirements. (For a detailed analysis of u.s. negotiated agreements in 
both the environmental and occupational health areas, see Caldart and 
Ashford, 1999.) 
Negotiated agreements may be divided into (1) negotiated regulation (either 
preceding formal regulation or as a substitute for formal regulation), including 
emission and effluent levels, and concentration limits in air, water and soil, and 
(2) technology-based standards, such as Best Available Technology (BAT); and 
negotiated compliance (implementing regulation or informal agreements), 
including the means and timetable for coming into compliance with emission, 
effluent, concentration, or product content requirements; and negotiation in 
the context of an enforcement action in which the firm is out of legal 
compliance (for example, encouraging cleaner production through the lever-
aging of penalty reductions). 
Negotiated regulation between government and industry over emission and 
effluent levels, and concentration limits in air, water and soil will, in general, 
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not encourage innovation, relative to classical regulation, unless the negotiat-
ing industry thinks it can use its possible superior pollution control or 
prevention technology to thwart domestic or foreign competition. The history 
of the effects of regulation on technological change indicate that only stringent 
regulation stimulates innovation, and usually firms negotiate regulatory limits 
to reduce their possible stringency. On the other hand, where acceptable limits 
are based on the performance of a particular technology (like BAT), and where 
a particular firm is able to negotiate industry-wide standards based on it's own 
technology, it may be motivated to innovate a superior technology which it can 
subsequently license or use to dominate the market. 
Negotiated compliance between government and a specific firm over the 
means and timetable for coming into compliance with emission, effluent, 
concentration, or product content requirements has the potential to stimulate 
innovation, particularly process innovation, but is more likely to encourage the 
adoption of superior, off-the-shelf technology. In the United States this has 
been done either through negotiating specific terms in a facility permit or 
through innovation waivers. The individual state-based negotiated permits 
have been inadequate to bring the states into compliance with many federal 
requirements, resulting in criticism that states have been too lenient and lax 
about imposing emission limitations. Thus, innovation is unlikely to be 
fostered, and only a modicum of superior technology diffusion is likely to have 
occurred. 
9.5.1. Innovation waivers 
Various environmental laws have had provisions allowing the Environmental 
Protection Agency to issue innovation waivers, to allow a firms additional time 
to develop innovative approaches to compliance (Ashford et aI., 1985). 
Similarly, variances have been available under the Occupational Safety and 
Health Act to employers seeking additional time to develop a new approach to 
worker protection. These provisions have rarely been used, however, both 
because industry has been unsure of their application has thus been wary of 
risking non-compliance, and because the agencies have not encouraged their 
use. 
Innovation waivers are incentive devices built into environmental regula-
tions. Generally, the waivers extend deadlines by which industry must meet 
emission or effluent limitations. Development of an innovative idea into an 
operational reality often requires trial periods and substantial time, during 
which a firm can incur penalties from violations of emissions or effluent 
standards. The innovation waiver exempts industry from penalties during trial 
periods and offers it the prospect of cost savings derived from a superior 
technology (the 1977 amendments to the Clean Air Act and the Clean water 
Act both provide for innovation waivers). 
Innovation waivers apply mostly to process change, are expressly innova-
tion-forcing, and do not promote diffusion. The agency will seldom use a 
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waiver mechanism for promoting radical process innovation because of the 
long time generally necessary to develop the innovation. The agency, however, 
might well encourage both incremental process innovation and acceleration of 
radical innovation already underway. Success will require EPA to give early, 
clear, and certain signals to the developer, minimizing the risk of his 
technology being found unacceptable. Furthermore, good faith efforts resulting 
in significant, though not complete, achievement of the pollution reduction 
goal should be rewarded by fail-soft strategies, using appropriate and adjus-
table economic sanctions, industry is to be persuaded to take a technical and 
legal risk. One can make a case for risk sharing between government and 
industry in the interest of fostering innovative solutions. 
9.5.2. Encouraging pollution prevention innovation and diffusion in enforcement 
settlements (see Becher and Ashford, 1995) 
The settlement of an enforcement action often offers the agency an excellent 
opportunity to promote pollution prevention, rather than conventional end-of-
pipe control technology. The firm's attention has been commanded, and a need 
for creative (and less costly) approaches to compliance may well have become 
apparent. EPA has sought to capitalize on this opportunity by encouraging the 
use of Supplemental Environmental Projects to promote pollution prevention. 
Firms found in violation of EPA regulations can take advantage of two 
relatively new EPA policies that invite the inclusion of pollution prevention in 
enforcement settlements. Companies that have done so reduced or eliminated 
an environmental problem at the source and enhanced their prospects for 
future compliance. Many companies received a penalty reduction for their 
efforts,. typically one dollar reduced for every two dollars expended. In order to 
increase the number of successful cases, the EPA Office of Enforcement 
commissioned the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to examine the 
agency's experience in promoting pollution prevention through its enforcement 
programmes. 
In June 1989, the EPA Office of Enforcement issued a Pollution Prevention 
Action Plan that articulated the agency's strategy for promoting pollution 
prevention in enforcement. The enforcement settlement process was the 
primary target. Roughly 90% of firms cited with noncriminal violations of 
federal environmental statutes resolved the matter through a negotiated 
settlement with one of 10 regional offices of EPA rather than administrative 
proceedings in court. In the settlement process, EPA and company attorneys 
agree on a penalty and a set of conditions designed to achieve and maintain 
compliance. EPA has little statutory or regulatory authority to require firms to 
implement pollution prevention; the regulated community can choose how it 
will comply with federal requirements. Once an enforcement action is initiated, 
however, a window of opportunity for pollution prevention opens because the 
means of achieving compliance are subject to agreement by the agency and 
violator. 
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The principal mechanisms for including pollution prevention in enforcement 
settlements were articulated in two EPA policy statements. In 1991, EPA issued 
its Policy on the Use of Supplemental Environmental Projects (SEPs) in 
Enforcement Settlements (internal memo dated February 12, 1991). SEPs are 
environmentally beneficial activities negotiated into the terms of a settlement 
with EPA. The SEP policy authorized EPA to reduce the assessed penalty in 
exchange for the execution of a SEP. There were five categories of SEPs: 
pollution prevention, pollution reduction, environmental restoration, environ-
mental auditing, and public awareness. In Fiscal Year 1992, EPA negotiated 
222 SEPs, excluding the 187 negotiated by the Office of Mobile Sources. 
Twenty-eight percent involved pollution prevention. For a description of an 
updated SEP policy, see EPA Supplemental Environmental Projects Policy, 29 
Environmental Reporter (BNA) 78~79 (1998) and Caldart and Ashford, 1999. 
Also in 1991, EPA issued its Interim EPA Policy on the Inclusion of Pollution 
Prevention and Recycling Provisions in Enforcement Settlements (internal memo 
dated February 25, 1991), which provides specific guidelines for including 
pollution prevention in a settlement as either a SEP or a method of compliance. 
The Interim Policy gives agency negotiators flexibility to extend compliance 
schedules when pollution preventions is used as the means of compliance, 
especially if innovative technology is involved. 
EPA can enhance and expand these activities. The research centered on case 
study analysis of nine SEPs and one enforcement settlement that used pollution 
prevention as the compliance method. In all 10 instances, a pollution 
prevention project was successfully negotiated into the terms of a legal 
settlement between the EPA and the firm. These settlements included chemical 
substitutions, process changes, or closed-loop recycling activities and were 
drawn from the universe of judicial and administrative enforcement actions 
negotiated by EPA up to and including fiscal year 1992. 
Of the 10 case studies, five were reporting violations under Emergency 
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), Section 313 (i.e. 
Form R, Toxics Release Inventory data reporting; two stemmed from Clean 
Water Act violations; one from a Clean Air Act violation; and one from 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act violation). The predominance in 
the study sample of EPCRA cases, that is, those involving failure to report 
toxic emissions on a Form R, reflects the relatively large number of pollution 
prevention SEPs in the larger sample population that were negotiated in 
EPCRA 313 settlements. 
The technological changes undertaken by firms can be categorized by 
pollution prevention projects according to the locus and innovativeness of the 
change. The majority of technological changes made by case study firms are 
diffusion driven. A smaller number can be considered incremental innovations, 
and only one case can be considered a major innovation. There is a fairly even 
distribution of technological changes across the spectrum of primary, second-
ary, and ancillary processes? If a random case study selection process had been 
used, the sample would have been more heavily weighted toward diffusion-
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driven changes to ancillary production processes. The larger universe of EPA 
settlements containing pollution prevention consisted mostly of adopting off-
the-shelf cleaning technologies. This suggests there are unexploited opportu-
nities in enforcement for stimulating innovative technological changes. This 
would require changing attitudes and levels of knowledge on the part of both 
the firm and EPA. 
Representatives from all nine of the SEP case study firms indicated support 
for the SEP policy. The firms were glad to have had the option to implement a 
pollution prevention project in exchange for some penalty reduction. The SEPs 
took some of the sting out of the enforcement process but did not eliminate the 
significant economic and psychological impacts of associated with being found 
out of compliance. Several companies stated that SEPs help to recognize their 
efforts to make improvements. 
The flexibility offered by the two EPA policies should be used more 
aggressively to enhance not only pollution prevention, but also the develop-
ment of new pollution prevention technologies and adoption of existing 
innovative technologies. Several of the cases demonstrated that this can be 
done, though not without determination and creativity on the part of both the 
agency and the firm. 
9.6. Conclusion 
Regulation, information-based ImtIatIves, and negotiated environmental 
agreements can all influence technological change. Changes could involve 
either the adoption of already-proven technologies, or incremental to radical 
innovation in inputs, processes, final products, and the organization of 
production and work. In order for optimal changes to occur in industry, 
agriculture, transportation, energy systems, and the service sector, firms must 
have the willingness, opportunity, and capacity or capability to undertake those 
changes. 
The capability to change depends on both the inherent innovativeness of the 
firm and available economic resources. The outcomes of various strategies will 
necessarily differ, depending on whether they create incentives which encou-
rage firms to investigate heretofore unrecognized problems related to worker 
health, safety, and the environment and to act on information the firm already 
has (as a result of being required to report emissions, effluents, and waste; by 
seeking to earn a product eco-Iabel; by undertaking eco-audits, or by negotiat-
ing the means and timetable for coming into compliance), to search for 
information outside the firm regarding already-existing solutions, thus 
encouraging the diffusion of technology from other firms or industries (as a 
result of performing technology options analysis), or to undertaken incre-
mental technological innovation, or more radical innovation if they can (as a 
result of applying for innovation waivers, negotiating compliance levels or 
technology-based standards with regulatory agencies, or negotiating pollution 
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prevention or cleaner/safer technology agreements with regulatory authori-
ties). The policy designer would be well advised to think about what kind of 
technological change is needed to address a worker health, safety, or environ-
mental problem and who is in the best position to deliver it. Sometimes it must 
be acknowledged that the firms creating the problems are not capable of 
providing the needed or best solutions, either because they do not have the 
requisite information, they do not have the requisite know-how, or because the 
lack of economic resources prevent their investing in technology development. 
In the first case, strategies which disseminate information or stimulate 
information searches is needed. In the second case, a deliberate strategy of 
encouraging displacement or radical transformation of the dominant technol-
ogy requires a new entrant (an outsider) to solve a particular worker health, 
safety, or environmental problem. In the latter case, financial assistance and 
incentives could help. What is important to realize is that the instruments and 
initiatives chosen should reflect the recognition that different policy instru-
ments will elicit different kinds of responses, sometimes from different actors. 
Strategic approaches should be fashioned in such a way as to encourage the 
best possible technological change from the actors in the best position to bring 
it about. As a result, a dynamic eco-efficiency, rather than static eco-efficiency 
might be achieved. 
Notes 
1. For a recent review of this perspective, see Jaffe et al. (1995). 
2. The distinction between primary, secondary, and ancillary manufacturingtlproduction process 
is an important one for innovation. An example in the context of casting and plating metal 
screws makes the point. The primary process is the casting of the screw. The secondary process 
is electroplating. The ancillary process is cleaning or degreasing the screw using organic 
solvents. If the environmental problems facing the firm is created by the latter activity, it might 
be relatively easy for the firm to search for and find an alternative, non-polluting cleaning 
process, and no innovation would be required. If the electroplating is the process that needs to 
be modified, at least a new process might have to be brought into the firm - usually by the 
diffusion of alternative plating technology - but the firm would be uncomfortable about 
changing a proven method and taking a chance on altering the appearance of its product, even 
if it is a separate operation. The most resistance could be expected by demands on the primary 
process. Here innovation might be necessary and the firm is not likely to invest in developing an 
entirely new casting process in order to reduce a regulatory fine. 
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